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Abstract 
The Internet has swept over the whole world. It is influencing almost every aspect of 
society. The blooming of electronic commerce on the back of the Internet further 
increases globalisation and free trade. However, the Internet will never reach its full 
potential as a new electronic media or marketplace unless agents are developed. The 
trading Agent Competition (TAC), which simulates online auctions, was designed to 
create a standard problem in the complex domain of electronic marketplaces and to 
inspire researchers from all over the world to develop distinctive software agents to a 
common exercise. In this thesis, a detailed study of intelligent software agents and a 
comprehensive investigation of the Trading Agent Competition will be presented. The 
design of the Risker Wise agent and a fuzzy logic system predicting the bid increase of 
the hotel auction in the TAC game will be discussed in detail. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In this chapter, the motivation behind this research will be introduced, the definitions of 
relative terms will be provided and the literature review of TAC game and TAC agents 
will be given. The overview of following chapters will be listed in the end of this 
chapter. 
1.1 Background 
Because of division of labour, most of people couldn' t be self-sufficient anymore. In 
order to survive, people need to exchange goods and/or services. A market is a 
mechanism which allows people to trade. The traditional market is where traders set up 
stalls and buyers look around the merchandise. Extending the concept of the traditional 
market, the modem shopping malls, shopping centres or shopping arcades are built. It is 
a building or set of buildings that contain many stores/shops, which is easy for people to 
walk from store to store. 
With the terrific developments of communication and information technologies, the 
Internet is experiencing an exponential growth. In 2000, there were 304 million people 
having Internet access and ten million domain names were registered (Anderberg, 
2003). The Internet Society data shows that there were approx 285,139,107 host 
computers on the Internet (Internet Domain Survey, 2004) and there were 46,067,743 
web sites by the year 2003 (Zakon, 2004). 
The Millions of people are assembled by the Internet. Internet has become a world-wide 
medium for collaboration and interaction between individuals without regard for 
geographic location. Markets do not have to always locate in a physical space. People 
can exchange goods and/or services on the Internet. The physical limitations of 
traditional auctions such as time, space and presence have disappeared. 
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Figure 2: WWW Growth (Zakon, 2004) 
The development and success of electronic commerce has dramatically increased the 
opportunities for automated trading agents because searching, accessing, filtering and 
integrating information is hard for a person or current computer systems especially 
when decisions are based on a massive amount of factors, using complex strategies. One 
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of the few studies comparing human and computer traders did not reflect very 
favourably on the humans (Das et al, 2001). Compared to human negotiation, automated 
trading agents can be faster, cheapter, more convenient (He 2004). Automated trading 
agents have the advantages of being able to work continuously and repetitively without 
losing concentration. Automated trading agents can also remove the human sensibilities 
that are often associated with bargaining (He 2004). 
Once the agent is realized, many of the obstacles that currently limit how people use 
computers will disappear. It will make users ' lives easier. People would like to delegate 
more functions to the agent (Negroponte, 1997). 
There are many different trading methods. Auction is one of them. An auction is the 
process of buying and selling things by offering them up for bid, taking bids, and then 
selling the item. Internet auctions have become very popular. In the Internet Auction 
List there were more than 2500 auction company listings in 2003 (He 2004). eBay, an 
on-line auction, has 100 million registered users around the world ( eBay, 2004). 
In order to understand the effectiveness of agent strategies, the possible influences of 
automated traders to electronic markets and also to stimulate research in trading agents 
with an emphasis on developing a successful strategy for maximizing profits in a 
constrained environment, the Trading Agent Competition (TAC) game was designed 
(Strother 2000). 
The TAC is a game simulating an electronic auction market. It was proposed by 
Wellman and Wurrnan. The first competition was held in July 2000 in Boston (Stone 
and Greenwald, 2001). TAC attracted 18 participants from six countries. Based on the 
success of the first event, the second competition was held in October 2001 in Tampa. 
The third TACs (Wellman et al., 2002; Greenwald, 2003), which were held in the 
following year had minor modifications. The fourth competition introduced new supply 
chain management research subject (Raghu et al., 2002). 
To play TAC, software agents need to be designed. The goal of an agent is to satisfy its 
client. The agent will play the role of a travel agent with the goal of putting travel 
packages together for its clients. Each agent has eight clients who would like to take a 
3 
trip and also have their preferences for various aspects of the trip. The travel packages 
include airline tickets, reserve hotel rooms, and entertainment events. All these items 
are traded in different kind of on-line auctions. 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the TAC game and TAC agents. A trading 
agent is designed and implemented. A fuzzy logic module used to predict the price is 
also designed. 
1.2 Definitions 
1.2.1 Software agent 
Before the agent definitions are given, one needs to be aware that there is not only one 
definition of agents. There are some widely accepted concepts characterizing agent 
systems and the definitions of agents with their own significances. They are described 
as follows: 
• "The agent is an autonomous, self-contained, reactive, pro-active computer 
system with central locus of control that is able to communicate with other 
agents by an Agent Communication Language" (Wooldridge and Jeannins, 
1994). 
• Agent-Oriented Programming - An approach to building agents with mentality 
such as beliefs, desire and intentions (Franklin, 1996). 
• An autonomous agent is a system which situated and is a part of the 
environment that senses that environment and acts in it to pursue its own agenda 
and to influence the future (Worldridge and J eannins, 1995). 
• An agent is an entity or object, which is able to execute symbolic external tasks, 
and reacts autonomously on the changes of its environment (Gadomski 1998). 
• A Software agent is a computer program which functions as a user's personal 
assistant by performing tasks autonomously or semi autonomously. It is more 
than a passive task receiver and execution program (Harmon, 1995). 
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• The general functional definitions of software agent and intelligent agent are 
given below: 
A. "A software agent is a functional software module that is able to execute 
some predefined class of external tasks and has autonomy during these task 
realizations. It reacts on the predefined states of its own environment 
according to acquired information, its own built-in preferences and 
knowledge" (Gadomski 1998). 
B. "An intelligent agent is an agent with capability to change and evaluate its 
own preferences and knowledge" (Gadomski 1998). For example, it can 
learn or change goals if the original objectives are not reachable. 
Researchers have offered a variety of agent definitions. The next section lists some of 
these definitions. 
Virdhagriswaran, a researcher of MuBot Agent, an acronym for "Mobile Unstructured 
Business Object" , defined that the agent has the ability for autonomous execution and 
domain oriented reasoning (Virdhagriswaran n.d.). 
Russell and Norvig, researchers of the AIMA (Artificial Intelligence: a Modem 
Approach) Agent, stated that: "An agent is anything that can be viewed as perceiving its 
environment through sensors and acting upon that environment through effectors" 
(Russell and Norvig 1995). 
Pattie Maes, researcher from MIT's Media Lab, described that Autonomous agents are 
computational systems that inhabit some complex dynamic environment, sense and act 
autonomously in this environment, and by doing so realize a set of goals or tasks for 
which they are designed" (Maes 1995). 
Smith, Cypher and Spohrer, researchers of the KidSim Agent defined an agent as a 
persistent software entity dedicated to a specific purpose. (Smith, Cypher and Spohrer 
1994) 
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Hayes-Roth thought that the intelligent agents need continuously perform three 
functions: "perception of dynamic conditions in the environment; action to affect 
conditions in the environment; and reasoning to interpret perceptions, solve problems, 
draw inferences, and determine actions" (Hayes-Roth 1996). 
Wooldridge and Jennings defined an agent as a hardware or (more usually) software-
based computer system that has the following properties: 
• Autonomy: an agent makes its own decisions about its actions and state rather 
than being influenced by others (Wooldridge and Jennings 1995) 
• Social ability: an agent communicates with other agents or humans (Wooldridge 
and Jennings 1995) 
• Reactivity: an agent perceives its environment and responds to it. It may make 
changes due to the environment (Wooldridge and Jennings 1995) 
• Pro-activeness: an agent takes the initiative instead of only responding to its 
environment (Wooldridge and Jennings 1995) 
Michael Coen, the researcher of the SodaBot Agent, defined: "Software agents are 
programs that engage in dialogs and negotiate and coordinate transfer of information" 
(Coen, 1995). 
Brustoloni claimed that "Autonomous agents are systems capable of autonomous, 
purposeful action in the real world" (Brustoloni 1991 ). 
Having these definitions given above, it is clear that there is no general definition for an 
agent. It could simply be described as a piece of software assisting users in the 
computers and computer networks. 
1.2.2 General properties of an agent 
The following sets are some agent attributes and properties. The list below is not 
complete and exhaustive. 
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• Reactivity: An agent has the ability to sense and act according to its 
environment. 
• Knowledgeable: An agent has the ability to reason its goals; acquire 
knowledge and information from its environment. 
• Inferential capability: An agent has the ability to make decision based on 
knowledge and information already have. It may choose best methods from 
itself, users, or other agents. 
• Autonomous: An agent has the ability to independently act for its users. It is 
proactive not reactive. 
• Adaptable: An agent has the ability to change its behaviour by learning, user 
preferences, or new capabilities. 
• Collaborative: An agent has the ability to communicate, co-operate or 
collaborate with other agents in multi-agent societies. 
• Communication ability: An agent has the ability to communicate with 
humans and other agents with suitable language. 
• Mobile: An agent has the ability to move from one executing environment to 
another and continuing execution in a new environment. 
• Persistent: An agent has the ability to keep its identity, knowledge and state 
over a long period of time even system failures. 
• Personality: An agent has the human characters such as emotion, humour, 
etc. 
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1.2.3 Auction types 
The following is a list of some basic types of auction: 
• One-sided: a single seller accepts bids from multiple buyers or a single buyer 
accepts bids from multiple sellers. 
• Two-sided or double auctions: multiple buyers and sellers to bid to trade goods. 
• Continuous double auction (CDA): buyers and sellers match immediately on 
compatible bids. 
• Sealed bid - No bids are visible to other bidders before auction closes. It clears 
only once and does not generate and publish price quotes. 
• Open-outcry - Bids are made public at time of bidding. 
• English (ascending) - Start at low price, increase amount until no further 
bidders, item goes to last bidder 
• Dutch ( descending) - Start at high price, decrease price til price accepted, e.g. 
tulips. 
• First price - Pay amount of bid 
• Second price - Pay amount of next highest bid 
• Uniform-price auction: All the successful bidders pay the same price, which is 
decided by the auction. 
• Common/Objective value - Item has identical value to all bidders, but each 
bidder has imprecise estimate. 
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• Private/Subjective Value - Each bidder knows and places different values on 
item according to the bidder's own information, but the bidder' s value is private 
information to the bidder themselves. 
Auctions can use any combination of the above types as long as they make sense. From 
the sellers' (auctioneer's) point of view, a good auction design gives the highest return 
to the seller. 
1.3 Literature review 
The TAC game and the strategies used in the TAC game will be introduced. 
1.3.1 General information of TAC game 
In each TAC game, eight trading agents compete for travel goods, with each agent 
representing eight clients. One customer can only have one agent. The duration of each 
game is 12 minutes. 
Travel packages consist of the following (Game Overview, n.d.) : 
1. A round-trip flight, 
2. A hotel reservation, and 
3. Tickets to some of the following entertainment events 
• Alligator wrestling 
• Amusement park 
• Museum 
Each customer will be given a set of preference for wishing to purchase travel 
arrangements. Preferences include the desired travel days; bonus for hotel quality; 
values for entertainment events. 
A client's preference is characterized by 
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• Ideal arrival and departure dates. 
• Bonus value for staying in the better hotel 
• Bonus values for each of the three types of entertainment events 
Agents must participate in auctions to try to acquire necessary resources. TAC has three 
different auction types bind together. Different auctions have different rules for 
matching the bids and recording the transactions. This increases the complexity of the 
TAC auction compare the real on-line auction. The three different kinds of auction in 
the TAC game are flight, hotel and entertainment auction. The flight auction is a 
continuously clearing one-sided auction with the changing price. The entertainment 
ticket auction is a standard continuous double auction. The most interesting auction is 
the hotel auction, which is a 16th price English ascending auction. 
All of the auctions follow the high-level protocol below: 
• Agents submit bids to the TAC server. 
• The TAC server updates its price quote, publishing the current going prices. 
Accepting bids, updating and publishing bids are most common tasks for an auction site 
server. 
1.3.2 TAC auction rules 
Different types of goods (flight tickets, hotel rooms and entertainment tickets) are 
traded at separate auctions with different rules. Agents can only buy air tickets and 
accommodation. Agents can buy and sell entertainment tickets. The following sections 
introduce the goods and auctions in the TAC market. 
1.3.2.1 Flight auctions 
1.3.2.1.1 Flight tickets 
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There is only one auction for each day and direction (arrival or departure). All the flight 
tickets are sold by the TAC server. There are two auctions in day 2, 3, 4. There is only 
one in flight auction in day 1 and out flight auction in day 5. (There will be no in flights 
on the last day, nor out flights on the first day.) There are 8 auctions in total. 
Day 1 Day2 Day3 Day4 Day5 
in flight in flight in flight in flight 
out flight out flight out flight out flight 
Table 1: The available flight tickets 
The TAC server offers an infinite supply of flight tickets. The details of the TAC flight 
price are described as follows . The TAC server sells the flight tickets based on a 
stochastic function. The method used to update flight prices is a random walk method. 
X(t) = 10 + (t I 720 )* (x-10) 
where t is the number of seconds since the game starts and x is a random variable 
chosen from a uniform distribution on [ 10, 90] for each flight separately (Game 
Overview, n.d.). 
In order to find the relationship between flight price and game time, an experiment was 
designed. After 100,000 experiments, it is found that the flight ticket prices increase 
linear over the time, and its difference is fairly large. 
Figure 3 is based on the result of the 100,000 experiments. The price starts from $10. 
The C++ program designed for the experiment is in Appendix 1. 
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Figure 3: The flight prices are biased to drift upwards. 
1.3.2.1.2 Flights auction 
Max 
Min 
Mean 
Flight auctions are continuously clearing one-sided auctions (TAC Server is a single 
seller, who accepts bids from multiple buyers), and clear continually (Once the action 
matches buyers and sellers, the transaction complete). 
Agents can only buy the flight tickets but cannot sell or exchange their flight tickets. 
TAC server only accepts bids for buying flight tickets from agents. 
If the price of buy bid point is equal to or higher than the current ask price, it will be 
matched immediately at the ask price. In other words, if the price of agent's buy bid is 
higher or equal to the TAC seller's sell price, the agent gets the ticket immediately and 
the agent has to pay for that. 
If the price of buy bid point is less than the current ask price, it cannot be matched. The 
bid remains in the TAC auction as a standing bid. A standing buy bid remains in the 
TAC auction unless it can be matched by a sell bid which price drops to the same as or 
below the price of the standing buy bid. Because the flight price increases over the time, 
the chance for the standing buy bid to be matched is not good. 
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For example, TAC seller submits a sell bid of ((-50 450)) while an agent submits a bid 
of ((5 580) (6 385)). There are five units at $450 each would be matched. Since the 
whole bid could not match, the remaining part, ((6 385)), would remain in the auction. 
1.3.2.2 Hotel auctions 
1.3.2.2.1 Hotel rooms 
There are only two hotels: one is Tampa Towers and another one is Shoreline Shanties. 
Clients must stay at least one night at one of the hotels. Tampa Towers hotel costs more 
compare with the Shoreline Shanties hotel. There are 16 rooms available per hotel per 
night. A client cannot change the hotels during the trip. 
1.3.2.2.2 Hotel auction 
Hotel auctions are Standard English ascending, multi-unit and sixteenth-price auctions 
(price increase, bidders pay amount of 16th highest bid), except that they all close at 
randomly determined times (Game Overview, n.d.). All of the bids whose price is 
higher than 16th price pay for the 16th price. Only the TAC servers can sell hotel 
rooms. There is no minimum bid price for either type of hotel. The TAC server sells 64 
hotel rooms in total. 
.. 
Price •• 
16th Price 
Demand (Bids) 
•• 
•• 
•• 
•• 
•• 
•• 
•• 
••• 
16 Quantity 
Figure 4: The illustration of 16th Hotel Auction. 
Since clients only need hotels from the first day of their arrival and through the last day 
before their departure, there are no hotels available on the last day. There are 8 hotel 
auctions. 
13 
Day 1 Day2 Day3 Day4 Day5 
TT Auction TT Auction TT Auction TT Auction 
SS Auction SS Auction SS Auction SS Auction 
Table 2: The hotel room auctions 
Hotel auctions all close at randomly determined times. Specifically, one randomly 
chosen hotel auction will be closed at four minutes after the game starts. Then one 
randomly chosen hotel auction will be closed each one minute thereafter until 11 
minutes when the last hotel auction is closed. The TAC server matches and clears hotel 
auction bids only once on the minute when it is closed (Game Overview, n.d.). 
The agents don't know in advance when and which hotel auction will be closed and 
what the price of the hotel. TAC server only generates price quotes once per minute, on 
the minute when the hotel auction is closed. In most of the real on-line auctions, humans 
instead of software agents make decision. The uncertainty of the hotel auctions 
increases the difficulties for making decision. The type of TAC hotel auction could be 
adopted in the future as the software agent technology develops. 
Agents can only submit buy bids instead of sell bids. The TAC seller submits sell bids 
to provide 16 rooms of two hotel types on each day for a minimum price above $0. The 
price quote is calculated as the 16th highest price between all buy and sell bid 
units. Second-price auction is more common than 16th auction. There is no big 
difference. To encourage bidders bid high is the same motivation behind 16th auction 
and Second-price auction. The optimistic bidders would hope that the 16th price or 2th 
price will lower than the price their bid. Maskin and Riley (1999) show that "strong" 
buyers prefer the second-price auction. 
Any new buy bid must satisfy the following conditions to be admitted to the auction: 
ASK be the current ask quote (16th highest price). 
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• It must offer to buy at least one room at a price greater than 16th highest price. It 
is not practical for a bid buying nothing. If the price is less than 16th highest 
price, the bid couldn't win anyway. 
• If the agent has already submitted its bids to the hotel auction. It can not 
withdraw its bid. In the real on-line auction, withdrawing bid is also not 
encouraged. For example, it may be allowed to retract (cancel) bid in some cases 
if the retraction meets the requirements of eBay strict bid retraction policy. 
• If the agent has a current buy bid, which could get m rooms in the current state, 
then the new bid must offer to buy at least m rooms a price greater than 16th 
highest price. This policy also encourage bidder bid high, which benefits the 
auctioneer. 
When the TAC server clears and closes the hotel auction, the 16th highest price buy bids 
will be matched and the agents will pay their ask price for the hotel rooms. 
For example, if the following hotel auction bids were submitted to TAC server: 
If the following hotel auction bids were submitted to TAC server: 
• Sell bid: ((-16 0)), 
• Agent 1: ((3 3) (5 5) (9 8)) 
• Agent 2: ((4 1)) 
Price 
8 
5 
3 
1 
-
-
0 9 13 16 
Figure 5: Example of Hotel Auction 
Quantity of Demand (Bids) 
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In this example, if the TAC closed the hotel auction on the minute, Agent 1 would get 9 
rooms at price 8, 5 rooms at price 5 and 2 rooms at price 3. Agent 1 asked for 17 rooms. 
It only got 16 rooms and Agent 2 did not get any rooms. 
1.3.2.3 Entertainment ticket auctions 
1.3.2.3.1 Entertainment tickets 
All the travel agents receive allocation of entertainment tickets at the beginning of the 
game. 
There are 8 entertainment tickets available for each entertainment type on each day in 
total. Each agent gets 12 entertainment tickets split as follows: 
• On day 1 or day 4: One package of four of a specific entertainment type and one 
package of two of another different type. 
• On day 2 or day 3: One package of four of a specific entertainment type and one 
package of two of another different type. 
1.3.2.3.2 Entertainment auction 
Agents buy or sell entertainment tickets through a continuous double auction (CDA), 
which all the agents can be buyers or sellers to bid to trade goods. Buyers and sellers 
match immediately for the compatible bids. There is one auction for each entertainment 
event on each day. Entertainment tickets are bought and sold on TAC auctions at prices 
the agents decide to bid. 
• Tickets owned from the initial allocation are free. 
• The score for selling entertainment tickets can be positive or negative because it 
is equal to the amount earned from selling entertainment tickets deduct the 
amount spent buying entertainment tickets. 
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Same as the hotel rooms, clients cannot use entertainment tickets on the day of 
departure ( day 5). 
Day 1 Day2 Day3 Day4 Day5 
Alligator Alligator Alligator Alligator 
Wrestling Wrestling Wrestling Wrestling 
Amusement Amusement Amusement Amusement 
Park Park Park Park 
Museum Museum Museum Museum 
Table 3: The available entertainment tickets auctions 
Agents can submit bids with buy and/or sell points as long as a bid does not sell to 
itself. If the sell bid points prices are the same or below the price of the buy bid, the buy 
bid points will immediately match the lowest price sell bid points. Auctions clear 
continuously once the bids match. If the buy bid points prices are the same or above the 
price of the sell bid, the sell bid points will immediately match the highest price buy bid 
points. A bid point which does not completely match remains in the entertainment 
tickets auction. 
Once new bids are submitted, price quotes are published immediately. The price quote 
includes the bid price and ask price. The price of the highest standing buy point will be 
the bid price. The price of the lowest standing sell point will be the ask price. 
For example, if the standing bids in an entertainment ticket auction were: 
• ((-2 101)) 
• ((-3 92) (-1 53)) 
• ((-5 63)) 
• ((2 44) (4 27)) 
• ((1 36)) 
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Figure 6: Example of Entertainment Auction 
)o" The bid price would become $44. 
)o" The ask price would become $53 . 
1.3.3 TAC bid format and protocols 
-
Quantity 
A bid represents an agent's willingness to sell and buy the goods in the auctions. A bid 
contains a bid string, which consists of a list of bid points in the following form: 
where qi is a quantity of the goods an agent wants to buy or sell 
Pi is a price of the goods an agent wants to buy or sell 
If qi > 0, it means that the agent wants to buy qi amount of the good at the auction for 
less than or equal to Pi price per unit of that goods. 
If qi < 0, it means that the agent wants to sell qi amount of the good at the auction for 
greater than or equal to pj price per unit of the good. 
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The prices should always be nonnegative. None of the agents would like to sell goods 
and pay the money. If prices were negative, agents could buy goods and get money. 
It is not acceptable in TAC for an agent submitting a bid to sell goods to itself. For 
example if an agent placed the bid "((-2 5) (2 1 0))", it could likely sell 2 units to itself at 
a price between $5 and $10. Agents sell goods to themselves would not get any benefit. 
It is waste of resources and time. It is sensible for an agent want to sell goods to itself. 
This TAC rule just prevents the agent make careless mistakes. 
If a bid is matched at the TAC server, the bid string will change after the match. For 
example, if an agent submits the bid "((-3 5) (-4 30))" and sells two units of the good for 
$5, then the bid string becomes "((-1 5) (-4 30))". The remains of bid string stay in the 
server waiting to be match. 
1.3.4 Final score of an TAC agent 
The TAC server computes and reports each agent's optimal allocation. It calculates the 
score for all the agents at the end of each TAC game. 
The final score of an agent is composed of: 
+ The value of the allocation of the goods to clients, 
- The penalty for changing clients ' preference, 
- The cost of buying flight tickets, hotel rooms and entertainment tickets, 
- The penalty for negative entertainment balances 
1.3.5 Characteristics of TAC game 
• First, there are contests between agents. For exmple, the hotel rooms are finite 
and the price is unpredictable and the order of auctions closing was unknown 
and unpredictable). 
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• Second, there are interdependencies (He and Jennings, 2004). These are 
relations between different types of auctions ( e.g. flight tickets will be wasted if 
the same hotel rooms are not available from arrival day to the day before 
departure); between different dates in the same type of auction ( e.g. customers 
must stay in the same hotel during their trip. Customers cannot get extra utility 
for attending the same type of entertainment more than once during their trip); 
between the same kind counterpart auctions in the same day (e.g. if the price of 
good hotel is high, the customer can change to cheap hotel at the same day). 
• Third, the bidding involves uncertainty (He and Jennings, 2004). For example, 
flight ticket prices start and change randomly; one randomly chosen hotel room 
auction closes from the 4th to 11 th minutes after game starts; the customers' 
preferences are assigned randomly and the way players bid for their hotel rooms 
is unpredictable if they are new players. 
• Fourth, a trade-off exists (He and Jennings, 2004). For instance, the prices of 
flight tickets in flight ticket auctions rise over the time as shown in the figure 3. 
But, if the agent buys cheap flight tickets very early, it might not be able to buy 
the necessary hotel rooms. This leads to some invalid travel packages. The flight 
tickets might be wasted. Hence, a trade-off exists between buying flights tickets 
earlier at lower prices and buying them later at higher prices to make sure they 
match with the hotel rooms that have been bought. 
1.3.6 Strategies of TAC agents 
The high-level bidding decisions of most previous games had the following structure: 
• Analyse the game environment and history data 
• Decide at what time to bid 
• Predict the prices 
• Decide on what goods to bid for 
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1.3.6.1 Analysis of competition environments 
The success of an agent not only depends on its own strategies, but also depends on the 
strategies of the other competitors. The best solution is relative to other players' strategy 
(Vetsikas and Selman, 2003). Peter Stone stated: 
The success of agent strategies depends a great deal on the strategies of the other 
competition (Stone, 2002). 
In both TAC-00 and TAC-01, the competitors learned about each other's strategies and 
made many adjustments. In TAC-00, only 14% of the agents were using a particularly 
effective (in isolation) high-bidding strategy during the qualifying round; by the finals 
58% of the agents were using this strategy (Stone, 2002). 
Before each game, A TTac downloads a published list of agents from the TAC website 
to identify known high-bidders. If there are more than two, it factors the information 
into bidding strategy. 
The agent SouthamptonTAC designed by He, Minghua and Jennings, Nick observed the 
TAC game market environment and categorized the TAC game market environment 
into three kinds of environments according to the different risk attitudes of other agents 
and decided different strategies correspond to different environments (He and Jennings, 
2004). 
• Non-competitive environment: there is no price war in the hotel room auctions. 
Agents can easily obtain the hotel rooms at very low prices. In this environment, 
the agent doesn't change the travel plan for each client. It buys almost all the 
flight tickets at the beginning of the game and all the rest of the tickets at the end 
of 4th minute (He and Jennings, 2004). 
• Semi-competitive environment: the competition of most hotel room auctions is 
reasonable. The hotel room prices are moderate e.g. the price of a good hotel 
room is 120 and the price of a cheap hotel room is 60. In this environment, the 
agent predicts the closing prices of the hotels and changes the travel plans for its 
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clients if new plans could make the clients' utilities higher enough. It buys 
almost all the flight tickets at the beginning of the game and all the rest tickets at 
the end of 4th minute (He and Jennings, 2004). 
• Competitive environment: there are price wars in the hotel room auctions. The 
prices of some hotel rooms are very high, e.g. the price of a good hotel room is 
300. In this environment, the agent uses the fuzzy reasoning methods to predict 
the hotel room closing prices and bid adaptively. It buys most flight tickets at the 
beginning of the game and the rest of the flight tickets based on the flight 
category (He and Jennings, 2004). 
The environments are decided by the past games history before a game starts. In the 
TAC semi-final, general seeding round data was used to predict the environment 
because there was not enough past data. 
After the 4th minutes of the game start, one of the hotel room auctions will be closed. 
The agent then can use the current hotel prices to decide if it needs to change its 
strategy. For example, the agent may change its strategy from Non-competitive 
environment to Competitive environment. 
1.3.6.2 Time to bid flight tickets: early bird and deliberate buyer 
The flight price in general is going up all the time as shown in figure 3. There is a 
dilemma, which is bidding early could get the cheap tickets but may waste the tickets 
(travel plan changes); or bidding late the agent can pay a high price for the tickets after 
the hotel auctions (accommodation secured not to waste the tickets). 
Bidding for all the flight tickets late is not very wise strategy (the price difference may 
be over $650). Vetsikas and Selman did experiment on the performance of different 
bidding times: 
• Late Bidder: Buy at the beginning only tickets that are "certain" to be used 
• Early Bidder: Buy all tickets at the beginning 
22 
High aggressive bidder bids for all rooms progressively closer to the marginal utility. 
Medium bidders bid for critical rooms close to marginal utility and the rest of the rooms 
an increment above the current price. 
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Figure 7: The performance of agents with four different strategies against different number of 
early-bidding agents (Vetsikas and Selman, 2003) 
Figure 7 shows that Early-bidding is better than late bidding. 
In TAC'0l, there are two main candidate heuristics - early bird and deliberate buyer 
(they are also called "open-loop" and "closed-loop" by Stone et al. 2003 respectively). 
A trading agent using the early bird heuristic makes decisions at the very beginning of 
game and does not change them. This early bird heuristic was recognized as the reason 
to the success of LivingAgent (Fritschi and Dorer, 2002). LivingAgent was the winner 
of TAC'0l. The early bird heuristic is based on perfect prediction assumption, which 
means that an agent could accurately predict the clearing prices for the auctions at the 
beginning of a game. This assumption is supposed to guarantee the optimality of static 
resource allocation (Ding et al. 2003). 
23 
The open-loop strategy has the advantage of buying a minimal set of goods. That is, it 
never buys more than it can use. On the other hand, it is susceptible to unexpected 
prices in that it can get stuck paying arbitrarily high prices for the hotel rooms it has 
decided to buy. In particular, if all eight agents are open loop and place very high bids 
for the goods they want, many of the prices will skyrocket, eliminating any potential 
profit. Thus, a set of open-loop agents would tend to get negative scores (Stone, 
Schapire, Littman, and McAllester, 2003). 
The agent like ATTac used a deliberate buyer bidding decision based on a cost-benefit 
analysis: ATTac analyses the costs of postponing bids on auctions, if the cost exceeds 
the benefit of winning that good under multiple scenarios, then decide to bid or not. 
Theoretically, the deliberate buyer should have a better performance compared to the 
early bird. But practically, its performance is very sensitive to its implementation. The 
difference of hotel room auction clearing prices and the ensemble of game participants 
also affect the performance of agents (Stone et al. 2002). Some experiments on open-
loop vs. closed-loop (deliberate buyer and early bird) strategies were completed. The 
results are shown in the table 4. 
Agent Score Utility 
Early Bidder 2869 ± 69 10079 ± 55 
ATTac-2001(2) 2614 ± 38 9671 ± 32 
ATTac-2001(3) 2570 ± 39 9641 ± 32 
ATTac-2001(4) 2494 ± 68 9613 ± 55 
Table 4: The results of one EarlyBidder against three different versions of deliberate buyer over 
197 games (Stone, et al, 2003) 
According to Stone, Schapire, Littman, and McAllester, the results in the table 4 suggest 
that the variation of the closing prices is the major decisive factor between the 
effectiveness of the open-loop and closed-loop strategies. They think that the closed-
loop strategy could do better in large price variance situation, while the open-loop 
strategy should do better in the small price variance situation (Stone, et al, 2003). 
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In T AC'02, the winners used both heuristics. "the most successful agents were 
primarily heuristic-based and domain-specific" (Greenwald, 2003). The originally NP-
complete optimisation problem became more tractable when the domain-specific 
heuristics are used. 
• Compose travel plans earlier: buy most flight tickets earlier but postpone 
purchasing "risky" flight tickets to allow change resource allocation later ( e.g. 
ATTAC (Stone et al., 2002) and Whitebear (Vetsikas and Selman, 2003)); 
• Change among different heuristics strategies according to the prediction of 
competitiveness environment of the TAC game (e.g. SouthamptonTAC (He and 
Jennings, 2004)); 
• Use early bird heuristic in the hotel and flight auctions, and bidder heuristic in 
the entertainment auctions (e.g. UMBCTAC (Ding et al., 2002)). 
The success of these strategies is based not only by the ability of predicting accurately, 
but also by the ability to avoid and handle risk, especially avoid buying hotel rooms at a 
very high price. 
Vetsikas and Selman (2003) did experiment on six different bidding strategies: high 
aggressive late Bidder; median aggressive late Bidder; high aggressive early Bidder; 
median aggressive early Bidder; high aggressive strategic Bidder; median aggressive 
strategic Bidder. 
Bidding Strategies for Hotels: 
~ Low aggressiveness: Bids higher than the current ask price by an increment. 
~ High aggressiveness: Bids for all rooms progressively closer to the marginal 
utility. 
~ Medium aggressiveness: Combines two previous strategies 
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./ For critical rooms (rooms with high marginal utility) the bid is close to 
the marginal utility 
./ For all other rooms it bids an increment above the current price (the 
increment increases as time passes) 
Bidding time for Plane Tickets 
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<( 
~ Late Bidder: (boundary str.): Buy at the beginning only tickets that are "certain" 
to be used 
~ Early Bidder: (boundary str.): Buy all tickets at the beginning 
~ Strategic Bidder: (intermediate str.) 
./ Uses "Strategic Demand Reduction" 
./ Buy all tickets at the beginning, except the ones that are "highly likely 
not to be used" 
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Figure 8: The performance of six different strategy agents in different environments (Vetsikas and 
Selman, 2003). 
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Figure 8 shows that the strategically bidding agents perform best overall. 
1.3.6.3 Analysis of the hotel combinations 
The success of an agent not only depends on its own strategies, but also depends on the 
preferences assigned by the server. There are 20 possible hotel combinations for a 
customer. Table 5 lists the 20 possible travel schedules. 
Number AD DD Hotel Number AD DD Hotel 
1 1 2 ss 11 1 2 TT 
2 2 3 ss 12 2 3 TT 
3 3 4 ss 13 3 4 TT 
4 4 5 ss 14 4 5 TT 
5 1 3 ss 15 1 3 TT 
6 2 4 ss 16 2 4 TT 
7 3 5 ss 17 3 5 TT 
8 1 4 ss 18 1 4 TT 
9 2 5 ss 19 2 5 TT 
10 1 5 ss 20 1 5 TT 
Table 5: A customer's possible travel schedules 
AD means Arrival Day, DD represents Departure Day. The number in AD, DD column 
corresponds to a weekday, e.g. 1 means Day 1. In the hotel column, TT means Tampa 
Towers and SS means Shoreline Shanties. 
Researchers from University of Maryland computed the estimated price for each hotel 
combination. Hotel price was based on 1000 games in the 2002 seeding round. The 
mean is denoted by a solid line, and the median is denoted by a circle (Ding, et al. 
2003). 
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Figure 9: The estimated price for each hotel combination (Ding, et al. 2003) 
For the same arrival day and departure day, it costs more for the agents to satisfy the 
clients who want to stay at Tampa Towers hotel than to satisfy the clients who want to 
stay at Shoreline Shanties hotel. 
For both Shoreline Shanties hotel and Tampa Towers hotel, it costs less for the agents to 
satisfy the clients whose arrival day is day 1 and departure day is day 2 than to satisfy 
the clients whose arrival day is day 1 and departure day is day 5. 
They found that (Ding, et al. 2003): 
• Shorter hotel combinations cost less 
• Short trips will always have better performance 
• Shoreline Shanties hotels cost less 
1.3.6.4 Price prediction 
Hotel auctions are important in securing feasible travel packages and the most contested 
items during the TAC competition. Because of the random nature of the customers' 
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preferences and the way other agents deal with their hotel bidding, there are risks and 
uncertainty associated with the hotel auctions. 
However, general price trends cannot be captured completely because they depend on 
the identity of the participating agents. The uncertainty of hotel price significantly 
influence the relative cost of assembling trips for clients. 
There are several approaches predicting hotel clearing price (Wellman et al. 2004): 
• Use the current price quote 
• Adjust the current price quote by the difference between clearing price and the 
price at current time 
• Predict by fitting a curve to the price points seen in the current game. 
• Predict based on closing price data for that hotel in the past games or also used 
extrapolation from current prices. 
• Similar approach as above, but condition on hotel closing time, awareness that 
the closing sequence will influence relative prices. 
• Similar approach as above, but condition on full ordering of hotel closings, or 
what hotels are open or close at a particular point. 
• Learn a mapping of the features of the current game to closing prices based on 
historic data. 
• Use Fuzzy logic rules based on observation about associations between abstract 
features. 
• Use a moving average technique 
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The team from the Artificial Intelligence laboratory, University of Michigan surveyed 
the price prediction approaches employed in T AC-02 game. Based on the survey 
responses and other strategies used in previous game, prediction techniques used in the 
TAC includes (Wellman, et al, 2004): 
• Historical Averaging: Agent harami; agent UMBCT AC; Agent 
SouthamptonTAC (He & Jennings, 2004); Agent ROXYBOT (Greenwald, 
2002); Agent cuhk (Wellman et al., 2002) 
• Machine Leaming: Agent ATTac (Stone et al., 2003), Agent kavayaH (Putchala 
et al., 2002) 
• Competitive Analysis: Agent Walverine (Cheng et al., 2005) (Greenwald, 2003) 
• Fuzzy reasoning techniques: Agent SouthamptonTAC (He and Jennings, 2004) 
• A Partially Observable Markov Decision Process Approach: Agent 
TOMAHACK (Braziunas, et al, 2002) 
• Branch-and-Bound Optimization: Agent SICS (Boyan and Greenwald 2001) 
1.3.6.5 What price to bid? 
In the first price auction, most of the buyers would like to bid low or the actual price 
because the winner pays her/his winning bid price. But in the second-price auction, the 
buyer may take the risk to bid high because the winner only pays the second highest 
price. What is the best strategy: to bid high or low or actual price in the second-price 
auction? Paup Klemperer states: 
A little reflection shows that in a second-price sealed-bid private-values auction 
it is optimal for a player to bid her/his true value, whatever other players do. In 
other words "truth telling" is a dominant strategy equilibrium (and so also a 
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Nash equilibrium), so here, too, the person with the highest value will win at a 
price equal to the value of the second-highest bidder (Klemperer, 1999). 
This is also applied to the TAC auctions. Each bidder places their own private values on 
the TAC items such as hotel rooms. The hotel auction is a 16th English ascending 
auction, which means the agent with the highest value will win at a price equal to the 
value of the 16th highest bidder. 
Assume that Bidderl and Bidder2 have the following price arrangement: 
• Bidderl high price: $ 600 
• Bidderl actual price: $ 200 
• Bidder I low price: $ 100 
• Bidder2 high price: $ 500 
• Bidder2 actual price: $ 150 
• Bidder2 low price: $ 50 
Assume that Bidder2 holds the 16th highest price in the 16th price auction. Bidderl 
enters the auction with different prices. Table 6 shows a simple example of how the 
equilibrium occurs. The description is from the Bidderl ' s point of view. 
~ Bid high Price Bid Actual Price Bid Low Price (bl) $600 (bl) $200 (bl) $100 2 
Bid high Price Win but lose. Have Happy to give up Lose but happy 
(b2) $500 to pay high price $500. (Unhappy) 
Bid Actual Price Win with profit $50 Win with profit $50 Lose (unhappy) 
(b2) $150 (Happy) (Happy) 
Bid Low Price Win with profit Win with profit Win with profit 
(b2) $50 $550 (Happy) $150 (Happy) $150 (Happy) 
Table 6: The bidder price matrix 1 
This example shows that if the bidder 1 bids the true value, it never loses. It only pays 
her/his acceptable price or makes profit when she wins. 
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This time, assume that Bidderl holds the 16th highest price in the 16th price auction. 
Bidder2 enter the auction with different prices. The description is from the Bidder2's 
point of view. 
~ Bid high Price Bid Actual Price Bid Low Price (bl) 2 (bl) $600 (bl) $200 $100 
Bid high Price Lose but happy. Win but lose $50 Win with $50 profit 
(b2) $500 Don't have to pay (Unhappy) happy high price $600. 
Bid Actual Price Lose but happy. Lose but happy. Win with $50 profit 
(b2) $150 Don't have to pay Don't have to pay happy high price $600. price $200. 
Bid Low Price Lose but happy. Lose but happy. Lose but unhappy. 
(b2) $50 Don't have to pay Don't have to pay Could have $50 high price $600. price $200. profit. 
Table 7: The bidder price matrix 2 
This example shows that if the bidder2 bids the true value, it never loses. It only pays 
her/his acceptable price or makes profit when she wins. 
Vetsikas and Selman talked about the bid price dilemma in their presentation (Vetsikas 
and Selman, 2003): 
• If not aggressive, could get outbid and lose rooms needed. 
• If too aggressive, prices will skyrocket and the agent's score will be reduced. 
Peter R. Wurman also pointed out that: 
"Truth telling is a dominant strategy because it is optimal regardless of the other 
agents' strategies" (Wurman et al., 1998). 
If all the agents use the same strategy, for example all bids low price or all bids true 
value. Which strategy is better? Wellman and other researchers did experiments on 
those two different bid strategies: shading (an agent bids at a lower price than its 
marginal values), non-shading (agents bid true marginal values). They found that if the 
agents bid their true values this would improve social welfare, but sacrifice individual 
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profits. The average client-adjusted payoffs for all shading, all non-shading are 3339 
and 3155, respectively. The corresponding market efficiencies are 88.5% and 89.4% 
(Wellman, et al., 2003). 
If the agent knows the other agents' strategies, there is another tactic that could be 
applied, which is "against the tide". There is an interesting observation of going "against 
the tide". Vetsikas and Selman stated: 
In general an agent wins when the agent is going against the tide. i.g. being 
aggressive when most other agents are not (Vetsikas and Selman, 2003). 
Experiments made by A TTac show that: When one ATTac played with seven Early 
Bidders, ATTac is against the tide. ATTac won. 
Agent Score Utility 
ATTac 2431 ± 464 8909 ± 264 
EarlyBidder -4880 ± 337 9870 ± 34 
Table 8: One A TTac played with seven Early Bidders (Stone, et al., 2002). 
When seven ATTac played with one Early Bidder, Early Bidder is against the tide. 
Early Bidder won. 
Agent Score Utility 
ATTac 2578 ± 25 9650 ± 21 
EarlyBidder 2869 ± 69 10079 ± 55 
Table 9: Seven ATTac played with one Early Bidder (Stone, et al., 2002). 
If in the unknown situation, the best strategy is to bid at true valuation. 
1.3.7.6 Completion problem 
Given the current holdings, and given ( expected) prices, what goods should be chosen 
to buy or sell at these prices? 
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There are two general approaches in T AC-01: 
• Global optimisation: Agents like whitebear solved the completion problem using 
global optimisation techniques used by T AC-00 agents, including integer linear 
programming (Stone et al. 2001) and heuristic search (Greenwald & Boyan 
2001). 
• Local optimisation: Agents like TacsMan constructed travel packages by 
optimising utility client-by-client (Porter, et al, n.d.). 
Local optimisation completion strategy is a kind of greedy strategy for allocation. It is 
computationally feasible to quickly determine the maximum utility achievable by one 
client given a set of purchased goods, move on to another client with the remaining 
goods, etc. However, this strategy can lead to sub-optimal solutions. 
A different approach is a heuristic approach that implements the greedy strategy over a 
number of random client orderings and chooses the most profitable resulting allocation. 
Empirically, the resulting allocation is often optimal. ATTac chose 100 random client 
orderings to implement the heuristic approach. In a set of seven games from just before 
the tournament, ATTac's greedy allocator was run approximately 600 times and 
produced allocations that averaged 99.5% of the optimal value (Stone, et al., 2001). 
1.3.6.6.1 Linear Programming Approach 
In the competition, Agent ATTac implemented integer linear programming approach, an 
allocation strategy to find the optimal allocation of goods (Stone, et al., 2001 ). The 
integer linear programming approach works by defining a set of variables, constraints 
on these variables, and an objective function. Agent ATTac defined 272 variables and 
188 constraints (Stone, et al., 2001). 
1.3.6.6.2 A Genetic Algorithm-Based Optimisation Technique 
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Agent PaininNEC used a combination of heuristics, including a genetic algorithm-based 
optimization technique to find the optimal requirements of hotel rooms (Greenwald, 
2003). Genetic Algorithms are useful and efficient when the search space is large, 
complex or poorly understood, the domain knowledge is scarce or expert knowledge is 
difficult to encode to narrow the search space. The advantages of the GA approach are 
intrinsically parallel; able to manipulate many parameters simultaneously and handle 
arbitrary kinds of constraints and objectives. Their major disadvantage is that they are 
relatively slow, being very computationally intensive compared to other methods, such 
as random optimization. 
1.3.6.6.3 Generate domain-specific heuristics approach 
Agent WHITEBEAR generates domain-specific heuristics and experiment with these 
heuristics to determine which are the most effective. Sometimes, the most effective 
heuristic is a combination of two or more heuristics (Vetsikas and Selman 2002). 
1.4 Summary 
In this chapter, the motivation behind this research was explained. The definitions of 
relative terms including softare agent were provided and the literature review of TAC 
game and TAC agents were given. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the TAC game and the TAC agents. As 
shown in the literature review, there has no article evaluating the TAC game from 
auctioneer's point of view. There is no article listing the changes of TAC game. There is 
no article describe about how to play against 7 aggressive open loop agents in TAC 
game. This thesis will address these issues. A fuzzy logic model for predicting the TAC 
hotel price change will be designed. A short overview of following sections in the thesis 
is presented below. 
Chapter 2: Is TAC game a good design? 
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In this chapter, the design of the TAC game will be evaluated from an auctioneer's point 
of view. The changes of TAC game will also be listed. 
Chapter 3: The RiskerWise agent 
In this chapter, the design and performance of the Risker Wise agent playing against 
seven open-loop EarlyBidder Dummy Agents will be presented in detail. And the 
relationships among score, utility and cost will be discussed. 
Chapter 4: Using Fuzzy Logic to Predict the Hotel Price Increase 
In this chapter, basic concepts of Fuzzy Logic are introduced and the design of fuzzy 
logic system for predicting hotel auction price change in TAC is explained. 
Chapter 5: Conclusion and future development 
This Chapter gives conclusions of the thesis and future development of the Fuzzy Logic 
hotel price change prediction System. 
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